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Foreword
Many of us have at one time or another been curiously drawn to the subject 
of  occupational  fraud.  Whether  observed  in  our  own  work  environments 
or  exposed  through  broader  media,  we  often  find  ourselves  perplexed  by 
the apparent ease with which an otherwise responsible organization can be 
financially violated by its own agents or employees. The simple fact of the 
matter of it is that we generally have confidence in the folks that work shoulder 
to shoulder in achieving the wellbeing of a collective venture. And that is 
received as a positive condition. 
As history has shown us, there can however be the occasional breach or abuse 
of the confidence placed in people. That is not to say that all individuals are 
necessarily capable or willing to resort to occupational fraud; but rather that 
businesses need be mindful of the prospect of occupational fraud and of the 
relative unpredictability of the potential or eventual aggressor.    
Recognizing  that  individual  occupational  frauds  are  more  often  than  not 
dwarfed by larger more discernable frauds and scandals, The Certified General 
Accountants Association of Canada (CGA-Canada) considers it timely to direct 
some attention to the inherent opportunity for occupational fraud within the 
domestic environment. Moreover, it is conceivable that in the current economic 
landscape of slow growth and deleveraging, the propensity for occupational 
fraud may in fact intensify. 
As the following pages corroborate, we are pleased that there is relatively 
little alarm with Canada’s exposure to occupational fraud. That said we can 
conservatively estimate that $3.2 billion is lost to Canadian businesses annually 
from occupational fraud alone. These findings are based on data compiled 
from our random national survey sample of 802 companies having fewer than 
500 employees; considered to be adequately representative of the sector. And 
as acknowledged by our survey participants, there is room for improvement 
within individual companies and within the aggregate SME sector.  
While we have undoubtedly all heard the anecdotal tales of occupational fraud, 
there is little comprehensive and conclusive reference that empirically measures 
the frequency, intensity, severity, and impact of occupational fraud. As such, 
this paper intents to contextualize the Canadian experience and to impart 
some best practice for consideration by those having an active interest in the 8
comprehension of fraud, the economic impact of fraud, or in the more technical 
dimensions of prevention, deterrence, and detection of occupational fraud.
Anthony Ariganello, CPA (Delaware), FCGA
President and Chief Executive Officer
The Certified General Accountants Association of Canada
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Executive Summary
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) form a very important segment 
of the Canadian economy constituting the majority of business establishments 
and  contributing  more  than  half  of  business-sector  GDP.  Despite  the 
importance of SMEs as a collective force, the visibility and economic power 
of small businesses suffer due to their size and frequent turnover. When it 
comes to the issue of businesses being subject to fraud, the moderate visibility 
of SMEs only contributes to the challenge of assessing the real scope of the 
problem. Two other challenges – focusing on a specific type of fraud in SMEs 
and gathering information about fraudulent activities – further impede our 
ability to understand whether or not fraud presents an acute threat to SMEs 
and whether concomitant elevated attention should be accorded.
Given the highly uncertain and unstable economic outlook, our limited knowledge 
regarding the true scale of fraud victimization of SMEs is particularly worrisome 
as deterioration in the economic situation may further exacerbate the risk of 
fraud. Recognizing the outlined challenges and limitations, CGA-Canada saw 
it timely to investigate the level of vulnerability of Canada’s largest segment of 
businesses – SMEs – to fraud. For that purpose, CGA-Canada commissioned 
a survey seeking to examine the prevalence and types of occupational fraud 
experienced by SMEs and to gather information on prevention and detection 
methods used by SMEs to safeguard against occupational fraud. Occupational 
fraud was chosen as the focus of the analysis as the presence and the size of the 
workforce are the two elements most common to all SMEs. As the following 
pages reveal, it can be reasonably contended that:
    A substantial number of different types of occupational fraud exist. 
Although occupational fraud is only one among many types of fraud to 
which SMEs are exposed, the taxonomy of occupational fraud is vast 
and includes more than 50 distinctive types of deception. However, the 
notion of occupational fraud should not be confused with the notion of 
“white-collar crime” as the latter may or may not involve the misuse of 
the employing organization’s resources. The profile of a typical white-
collar perpetrator is also noticeably different from that of a perpetrator 
committing occupational fraud. 
110
    The majority of SMEs are not prepared to respond to occupational 
fraud, and more than half do not undertake periodic assessments of 
risks of fraud. Only one fifth (20%) of all surveyed SMEs have a Fraud 
Response Plan while the overwhelming majority (80%) do not. Some 59% 
of the surveyed SMEs do not undertake periodic assessments of the risks 
of occupational fraud, and companies that experienced fraud in the last 
fiscal year are not more likely to engage in this activity. However, SMEs 
victimized by fraud tend to make some adjustments as a result of fraud 
victimization: the majority (57%) of them revise disciplinary actions to 
be administered in case of fraud while 2 in 5 victim companies modify 
protocols  for  hiring  and  retaining  employees,  and  adjust  policies  and 
channels for reporting employees’ concerns about fraud. 
    A large proportion of SMEs believe the risk of occupational fraud is low; 
however, 1 in 4 SMEs experienced incidents of occupational fraud in the 
last fiscal year. Only 5% of SMEs believe that occupational fraud poses a 
high risk for them while the majority (74%) believe that their exposure is 
low. Moreover, one quarter (26%) of surveyed SMEs do not see themselves 
as susceptible to any particular type of occupational fraud. However, one 
quarter (26%) of SMEs report to have experienced at least one incident of 
occupational fraud in the past fiscal year. This translates into an estimated 
290,000 Canadian SMEs victimized by occupational fraud in 2010. The 
most often cited type of occupational fraud experienced by SMEs relates 
to misappropriation of inventory or assets; followed by misappropriation 
of  cash;  and  misrepresentation  of  employment  credentials,  internal  or 
external documents. Reoccurrence of fraud is common: at least one fifth 
of SMEs that experienced misappropriation of cash, inventory or assets 
confirmed that those types of fraud occurred four or more times in their 
respective companies in the last fiscal year. 
    The awareness of risks and implications of occupational fraud improves 
among SMEs that experienced incidents of fraud. SMEs that encountered 
at least one incident of occupational fraud in the last fiscal year are more 
than twice as likely to gauge the risk of occupational fraud as either high or 
moderate compared to companies that did not experience fraud incidents. 
Victimized SMEs are also much more likely to assess their companies as 
susceptible to any given type of occupational fraud, agree that they need 
improvements in fraud prevention and detection measures, and have a 
Fraud Response Plan. However, previous victimization of an SME by way 
of occupational fraud does not seem to improve the SME’s propensity to 
use fraud prevention and detection measures. 11
    Financial losses incurred by individual SMEs due to occupational fraud 
are not large; however, non-monetary negative consequences of fraud 
are reported by many. For more than half (55%) of the reporting SMEs, 
financial  losses  experienced  due  to  occupational  fraud  do  not  exceed 
$1,000; for another 26% of reporting companies, losses range between 
$1,000  and  $5,000.  Meanwhile,  less  than  1%  of  SMEs  report  being 
victimized by an occupational fraud event exceeding $200,000. In turn, 
61% of victim companies gauge that fraudulent activities negatively affect 
the moral of their employees; at least one fifth agree that a company’s 
business relationships, reputation, value, and public and client trust suffered 
as a result of fraud. 
    Nearly all SMEs utilize occupational fraud prevention measures; in 
turn, 1 in 10 companies does not have any fraud detection measures 
in place. The two most commonly used techniques of occupational fraud 
prevention include clear and uniform accounting procedures, and frequent 
financial reviews and/or reconciliations: 4 in 5 of surveyed SMEs utilize 
these measures. Reliance on a wide range of measures is common: 49% of 
SMEs have six or more fraud prevention measures in place. When it comes 
to fraud detection, 11% of SMEs do not incorporate any particular fraud 
detection techniques in their business activities. Among SMEs that use 
at least one fraud detection measure, 69% rely on a system of monitoring 
and safeguarding assets; whereas 59% and 49% rely on internal and/or 
external auditors respectively to detect fraud. Unlike prevention measures, 
the use of multiple fraud detection measures is not very common: 52% of 
SMEs utilize three or less fraud detection measures at a time. The majority 
of SMEs (60%) do not think that a significant improvement in occupational 
fraud prevention and/or detection is needed in their company.
    SMEs’ experiences with, and attitude toward occupational fraud varies 
with  company  characteristics.  Larger  SMEs  (those  generating  more 
than $5 million in annual revenues or employing between 20 and 499 
employees) have higher awareness of the risk of occupational fraud, but are 
also more likely to be victimized by fraud and experience larger financial 
losses when compared to smaller SMEs. Likewise, larger SMEs show 
higher propensity to conduct periodic assessment of risks of occupational 
fraud, use fraud prevention and detection techniques, and be equipped with 
a Fraud Response Plan. The SME’s industry affiliation is also important. 
Companies operating in service-producing industries for example are less 
likely to conduct periodic assessment of fraud risks, but tend to experience 
higher financial losses from occupational fraud when compared to SMEs 
in goods-producing industries.12
    Noticeable  regional  differences  are  likewise  observed.  Reporting 
companies located in Québec are less likely to experience occupational 
fraud: only 16% of Québec SMEs encountered incidents of occupational 
fraud  in  the  last  fiscal  year;  in  Ontario  and  British  Columbia  this 
proportion is almost twice higher (31% and 37% respectively), whereas 
Canada averages at 26%. Québec SMEs are also consistently less likely to 
use fraud prevention and detection measures compared to Canada overall; 
however they more often agreed that a significant improvement in the area 
of occupational fraud prevention is needed. A number of other provincial 
variations also exist; however, with no particular pattern. 
    Very few sources provide information on the presence and prevalence 
of occupational fraud in Canadian business, and none of them are 
comprehensive. Statistics Canada’s Survey of Fraud against Businesses 
– the only source of official statistics on business fraud in Canada – is 
focused  on  a  narrow  set  of  industries  and  provides  very  few  details 
regarding  occupational  fraud.  Private  sources  of  information  on 
incidents  of  occupational  fraud  are  primarily  limited  to  a  few  studies 
offered  by  the  Association  of  Certified  Fraud  Examiners  (ACFE)  and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. However, these sources are either focused on 
characteristics of the fraud and its perpetrators without addressing the 
issue of fraud prevalence, or touch upon it but only briefly. In addition to 
the scarcity of information on incidences of occupational fraud in Canada, 
the existing sources do not provide a consistent picture. 
Based  on  these  findings,  it  is  reasonable  to  espouse  the  following  four 
conclusions.  First,  SMEs  are  not  highly  concerned  with  issues  related  to 
occupational fraud; the lack of first-hand experience with occupational fraud 
may  be  a  contributing  factor.  Second,  the  magnitude  of  financial  losses 
incurred by SMEs resulting from occupational fraud suggests that this type 
of fraud does not present a significant problem for the SME sector; however 
such an inference may benefit from additional consideration. Third, a multi-
faceted information gap regarding the presence and impact of occupational 
fraud on SMEs continues to exist. And lastly, room for improvement on issues 
of occupational fraud exists for businesses. 13
Introduction
 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) form a highly important segment 
of the Canadian economy. They account for some 1.14 million business entities 
or  99.7%1  of  all  businesses  with  employees  located  in  Canada.  Likewise, 
SMEs contribute significantly to the Canadian labour force: some 6.8 million 
Canadians are employed by SMEs accounting for 63.9% of all private sector 
employees and nearly half (47.3%) of all those employed in Canada.2 SMEs are 
particularly important in such industries as construction, accommodation and 
food, forestry, and non-institutional health care where they provide 4 out of 5 
jobs. Not less impressive is the contribution of small business to the economy 
itself: SMEs produce more than half (54.2%) of Canada’s business-sector GDP.3
Beyond the economic statistics, the importance of the SME sector is often 
linked to its critical role as a backbone of local communities as they have 
a  unique  ability  to  meet  special  market  needs  and  interests  that  may  be 
overlooked by larger businesses. Although SMEs enter and exit the market 
much more frequently than their larger counterparts, such a turnover is often 
seen as a conduit that introduces new and innovative products and processes 
into the economy, and as a channel that facilitates greater labour mobility 
through job creation.
Despite  the  importance  of  SMEs  as  a  collective  force,  the  visibility  and 
economic power of individual business establishments suffer due to their size 
and frequent turnover. It is quite seldom that SMEs can promote their name 
and brand by engaging in extensive advertising campaigns or sponsoring public 
events to the same extent as their larger listed counterparts. Very few SMEs 
are listed on stock exchanges and publicly traded; as such, their wellbeing is 
not of equal interest to the larger audience of potential investors and financial 
analysts. Likewise, the relatively small size of a particular SME seldom places 
it in a position of a newsmaker outside of its local community in terms of 
recruitment, layoffs, closures, or other hardships that businesses may encounter 
in their day-to-day dealings. Moreover, one half of SMEs do not survive in the 
marketplace for more than 5 years.4
1	 	 Industry	Canada	(2011).	Key Small Business Statistics,	p.	7.
2	 	 Industry	Canada	(2011).	Key Small Business Statistics,	p.	19,	and	CANSIM	Table	282-0011.	The	
numbers	presented	exclude	the	following	industries:	agriculture,	fishing	and	trapping,	private	
household	services,	religious	organizations	and	military	personnel	of	defence	services.
3	 	 Leung,	D.	and	Rispoli,	L.	(2011).	The Contribution of Small and Medium-sized Businesses to Gross 
Domestic Product: A Canada-United States Comparison,	Statistics	Canada,	Catalogue	no.	11F0027M	
–	No.	070.
4	 	 Industry	Canada	(2011).	Key Small Business Statistics,	p.	14.
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When it comes to the issue of businesses being victims of fraud – whether 
committed by external perpetrators or by employees – the subdued visibility of 
SMEs only further contributes to the challenge of assessing the real scope of 
the problem. A fraudulent activity that victimized an SME is rarely a subject 
of the news headlines unless the scheme affected hundreds of businesses and 
the monetary value of the damage may be measured in millions of dollars. Two 
other challenges – focusing on a specific type of fraud and gathering information 
about fraudulent activities – further impede our ability to understand whether 
or not fraud presents a meaningful threat to SMEs and thus should be accorded 
elevated attention. 
In broad terms, fraud can be defined as an act whereby an individual or group 
of individuals by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, defrauds the 
public or any person or business, of any property, money, valuable security, or 
service.5 However, a dozen divergent types of fraud may easily fit under this 
definition including securities-related frauds such as Ponzi schemes, accounting 
frauds that overstate the value of company revenues and assets, mass marketing 
fraud that victimizes consumers, mortgage and real estate fraud, identity fraud, 
tax fraud and money laundering, fraud in public procurement, health care and 
immigration fraud, etc. 
When  speaking  about  victimization  of  businesses,  fraud  is  believed  to  be 
industry-specific: the business process and the array of products and services 
vary greatly from one industry to the other and so does the vulnerability to and 
likelihood of different types of fraud. As SMEs constitute the vast majority 
of all businesses in the Canadian economy, they are present in all industries 
and are in all types of business, and thus may be subject to a diverse range of 
fraudulent activities. It is then impossible to speak about the presence of fraud 
in SMEs without narrowing the consideration to either a specific industry or a 
specific type of fraud, or both. 
As will be further discussed in Section 3.2, our knowledge of the extent of 
fraud victimization of Canadian business is rather limited, particularly when it 
comes to SMEs. Very few industry associations or other centralized agencies 
collect data on fraud from businesses while information that is collected is often 
incomprehensive and incomparable between industries.6 Police records may be 
a useful and reliable source of information, but it is assumed that they are not 
very representative of fraud committed against businesses as the reporting rate 
is low. Complementing police records with information available in company 
records may also be problematic as SMEs often do not keep track of incidents 
5	 	 Taylor-Butts,	A.	and	Perreault,	S.	(2009).	Fraud Against Businesses in Canada: Results from a National 
Survey,	Statistics	Canada,	Catalogue	no.	85-571-X,	p.	6.
6	 	 Statistics	Canada	(2005).	A Feasibility Report on Improving the Measurement of Fraud in Canada.
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of fraud in their internal or accessible records.7 At the same time, it is believed 
that SMEs are particularly vulnerable to fraud because of the limited financial 
and human resources dedicated to effective fraud detection and prevention.8
Although the Canadian economy experienced a relatively quick recovery after 
the 2008-2009 recession and financial crisis, the global economic outlook has 
deteriorated again over the summer and fall of 2011. Ongoing deleveraging 
by banks and households, increased fiscal austerity and declining business 
and  consumer  confidence  is  expected  to  restrain  growth  across  advanced 
economies. Acute fiscal and financial strains in Europe have intensified the 
fear of severe dislocations in global funding markets. The “R” word is again 
becoming part of our vernacular in the United States, Europe and even Canada.
Given  the  highly  uncertain  and  unstable  economic  outlook,  our  limited 
knowledge  regarding  the  true  scale  of  fraud  victimization  of  SMEs  is 
particularly worrisome. Research shows that economic downturn may present 
a heightened risk of fraud as recession conditions impose increased pressures, 
present individuals with greater incentives to commit fraud, and may also 
increase gaps in control systems as fewer resources are deployed to focus on 
internal controls. 
Recognizing the challenges and limitations outlined above, CGA-Canada sees 
it timely to assess the level of vulnerability of Canada’s largest segment of 
business establishments – SMEs – to fraud. For that purpose, CGA-Canada 
commissioned a survey that sought to examine the prevalence and types of 
occupational fraud experienced by SMEs and to gather information on prevention 
and detection methods used by SMEs to safeguard against occupational fraud. 
Occupational fraud (versus other forms of fraud) was chosen as the focus of 
the examination as the existence and the size of the workforce are the two 
elements that are common to all SMEs, but also differentiate them from other 
types of business. Moreover, previous research suggested that small businesses 
may be disproportionally victimized by occupational fraud when compared to 
their larger counterparts.9 
In  the  following  text,  we  begin  with  a  brief  overview  of  the  notion  of 
occupational fraud and our current knowledge on its prevalence in SMEs. 
We then present the key findings of CGA-Canada’s survey of the presence of 
occupational fraud in Canadian SMEs and provide additional considerations 
7	 	 Statistics	Canada	(2005).	A Feasibility Report on Improving the Measurement of Fraud in Canada,	
p. 12-14
8	 	 Peltier-Rivest,	D.	(2009).	An Analysis of the Victims of Occupational Fraud: A Canadian Perspective, 
Journal	of	Financial	Crime,	Vol.	16,	No.	1,	p.	65
9	 	 Association	of	Certified	Fraud	Examiners	(2010).	Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and 
Abuse,	and	Peltier-Rivest,	D.	(2007).	Detecting Occupational Fraud in Canada: A Study of its Victims 
and Perpetrators,	Association	of	Certified	Fraud	Examiners.	
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supplementing selected survey results. We conclude by highlighting the most 
salient aspects of our findings, along with some practical recommendations. 
Appendix A describes the survey methodology and replicates the administered 
survey questionnaire.17
Occupational Fraud in SMEs –  
An Overview
Three elements are thought to constitute the core of any fraudulent activity and 
thus be present in all fraud cases. An act of fraud includes (i) a material false 
statement or action that has been made with the purposeful intent to deceive, 
whereas (ii) the victim of fraud relied upon the purposefully false statement or 
action of the perpetrator, and (iii) incurred damage as a result of false statement 
or action of the perpetrator.10 Although the core notion of occupational fraud 
is also based on these three elements, a number of additional aspects form 
the definition and distinctive nature of occupational fraud. The paragraphs 
that follow discuss in more detail the notion of occupational fraud as well as 
the extent of knowledge regarding the presence of occupational fraud in the 
Canadian marketplace. 
3.1. What is Occupational Fraud?
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) defines occupational 
fraud as the “use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment through the 
deliberate misuse or misappropriation of the employing organization’s resources 
or assets”.11 It is not uncommon that occupational fraud is colloquially referred 
to as “employee fraud” or “internal fraud”; the essence, nevertheless, remains 
the same – it is fraud that is committed by employees, managers and company 
owners where the victim of fraud is the organization itself. Four key elements 
are usually present in an occupational fraud scheme: the scheme is clandestine, 
it violates the perpetrator’s duties to the organization, it is committed for direct 
or indirect financial gain of the perpetrator, and it costs the organization assets, 
revenues or reserves.12 
The  ACFE  has  developed  a  detailed  taxonomy  of  occupational  fraud 
according to which there are three mutually exclusive categories of fraud: asset 
misappropriation, corruption, and fraudulent statements. Asset misappropriation 
is a scheme that involves the theft or misuse of an organization’s assets. Common 
examples of asset misappropriation include false invoicing, payroll fraud, and 
skimming. Corruption is a scheme in which a perpetrator uses his or her influence 
in a business or official transaction to obtain an unauthorized benefit contrary to 
that person’s duty to his or her employer. Examples of corruption include paying 
or accepting bribes or illegal gratuities, engaging in self-dealing transactions 
or engaging in conflicts of interest. Fraudulent statements fraud is a scheme 
3
10	 	 Lord,	A.	T.	(2010).	The Prevalence of Fraud: What Should We, as Academics, Be Doing to Address the 
Problem?	Accounting	and	Management	Information	Systems,	Vol.	9,	No.	1,	p.	5
11	 	 ACFE	(1996).	Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse,	p.	2.
12	 	 Saksena,	P.	N.	(2010).	Ethical Theories and the Incidence of Occupational Fraud,	Proceedings	of	the	
Academy	of	Accounting	and	Financial	Studies,	Vol.	15,	No.	2,	p.	34
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that involves the deliberate misstatement or falsification of an organization’s 
financial  or  non-financial  statements.  In  order  to  meet  the  definition  of 
occupational fraud, fraudulent statements must bring direct or indirect financial 
benefit to the perpetrator. Common examples include recording fictitious sales, 
concealing liabilities or expenses, and falsifying employment credentials.13 It 
should be recognized that the detailed taxonomy of occupational fraud further 
subdivides asset misappropriation, corruption, and fraudulent statements into 
more than 50 sub-categories.
The notion of white-collar crime often comes to mind when speaking about 
occupational fraud, particularly so since a number of high-profile white-collar 
crimes have shaken the world in the past decade including those of Enron, 
WorldCom, Tyco, ImClone, and cases of Bernard Madoff and Earl Jones. 
Although white-collar crime often involves fraud, the notion of occupational 
fraud should not be confused with the notion of white-collar crime. White-
collar crime may be a corporate or an occupational crime. The first category 
includes  offenses  committed  by  corporations  and  their  officials  for  the 
benefit of the corporation and its principals. The second category of crime 
is committed in the course of activity in a legitimate occupation and can be 
committed by employees against employers, employers against employees, or 
by those who by virtue of their occupation provide services and goods to the 
public.14 Occupational fraud, in turn, is a crime committed by an individual 
against the employing organization and legitimate employment is a condition 
for occupational fraud. 
Similarly, there is a difference between the typical white-collar offender and the 
offender that commits occupational fraud. The typical white-collar offender is 
frequently characterized as a highly educated white male, aged forty on average, 
situated in the upper managerial ranks of his organization, who commits a 
one-time criminal act.15 Unlike white-collar perpetrators who share distinct 
sets of characteristics, characteristics of offenders committing occupational 
fraud vary based on the specific type of fraud committed. Research shows 
that  individuals  who  commit  asset  misappropriation  are  typically  younger 
and have significantly lower levels of education than those who engage in 
either corruption or fraudulent statements. Moreover, individuals that commit 
assets misappropriation and corruption are also less likely to be managers or 
executives  compared  to  individuals  who  commit  fraudulent  statements.  In 
addition, there is a nearly equal likelihood for the occupational fraud offender 
13	 	 ACFE	(2008).	Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse,	p.	10,	and	ACFE	(2007).	
Detecting Occupational Fraud in Canada: A Study of its Victims and Perpetrators,	p.	8.
14	 	 Green	S.	P.	(2004).	The Concept of White Collar Crime in Law and Legal Theory,	Buffalo	Criminal	Law	
Review,	Vol.	8,	No.	1,	p.	109.
15	 	 Holtfreter,	K.	(2005).	Is Occupational Fraud “Typical” White-collar Crime? A Comparison of Individual 
and Organizational Characteristics,	Journal	of	Criminal	Justice,	Vol.	33,	p.	354.
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to be male or female and the majority of these perpetrators are employees 
rather than managers or executives.16
3.2. What Do We Know about the Presence  
of Occupational Fraud in Canada?
Two most common sources of information may be sought out to inform us 
regarding the prevalence of occupational fraud in Canada, and specifically 
in  SMEs:  (i)  official  statistics  collected  by  government  agencies,  and  (ii) 
information gathered by other interested groups and stakeholders involved 
in the matters of fraud analysis and prevention. The paragraphs that follow 
explore these sources in greater detail.
3.2.1. Official Statistics on Incidences of Occupational Fraud
The  data  from  Statistics  Canada  suggest  that  87,695  incidents  of  fraud 
substantiated by police took place in 2010; 7% of those cases were related to 
identity fraud.17 Although the number of fraud incidents appears to be large, it 
says very little about the seriousness of the offence, its nature and the nature of 
the victim, the method by which it was committed, and the monetary value of 
the damage caused. Similarly, this statistic naturally provides no information 
or estimates on incidents of fraud that were not reported to the police. In fact, 
very limited information is available on what is understood by “fraud” in the 
data provided by Statistics Canada. The total number of incidents of fraud 
includes cheque and credit card fraud, but also contains the “other” category 
which may comprise securities-related frauds, insider trading, accounting fraud, 
mass marketing fraud, mortgage and real estate fraud, and other types of fraud. 
As such, there is little in the way of official public statistics that can be used to 
at least somewhat understand the nature of fraud and its victims, leaving aside 
the issues related to such a specific type of fraud as occupational fraud in SMEs.
Recognizing the existence of the information gap regarding fraudulent activities 
in Canada, the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS) undertook a study 
in 2005 to assess the feasibility of improving the measurement of fraud by 
collecting data directly from business and business associations. The analysis 
prompted Statistics Canada to recommend introducing a survey of businesses 
to gather data that allows measuring the nature and extent of fraud experienced 
by  businesses.18  This  recommendation  was  implemented  in  2008  when 
Statistics Canada conducted the Survey of Fraud Against Businesses (SFAB) 
seeking to build a standard, more comprehensive picture of the prevalence and 
characteristics of business fraud in Canada.
16	 	 Holtfreter,	K.	(2005).	Is Occupational Fraud “Typical” White-collar Crime? A Comparison of Individual 
and Organizational Characteristics,	Journal	of	Criminal	Justice,	Vol.	33,	p.	359-360
17	 	 Based	on	CANSIM	Table	252-0051.
18	 	 Statistics	Canada	(2005).	A Feasibility Report on Improving the Measurement of Fraud in Canada,	
Catalogue	no.	85-569-XIE,	p.	14.
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Although the introduction of the SFAB was an important step in improving the 
availability of fraud-related information, both the scope and the regularity of 
the survey have continued to present the main deficiency of this data collection 
tool. The survey covered only three industries – retail, banking, and health and 
property insurance – that together account for a mere 16.5%19 of all business 
establishments in Canada. In addition, the survey focused primarily on types of 
fraud that were specific to those industries. Although the survey collected data 
on both non-employee and employees (i.e. occupational) fraud,20 it included 
an only limited categorization of the types of occupational fraud, namely 
assets misappropriation and financial misrepresentation. In turn, such forms of 
occupational fraud as corruption and non-financial fraudulent statements were 
not included in the survey. Moreover, the survey was conducted only once – 
in 2008 – and does not allow analysing changes in prevalence of fraudulent 
activities over time.
As a result of the recognized shortcomings, the SFAB provides only limited 
information on occupational fraud, and does not attempt to examine the link 
between occupational fraud and the size of the company. In instances where the 
SFAB does offer some insights on the differences in fraud-related experience 
of businesses of different sizes, the information is imparted as it relates to 
fraud in general and not specifically to occupational fraud. Below, we provide 
those few extracts from the SFAB results that speak about occupational fraud 
and the company size differentials:21
•  Overall,  only  15%  of  businesses  experienced  occupational  fraud; 
these included 19% of surveyed retail establishments, 3% of insurance 
establishments and 5% of banks. The prevalence of fraudulent activities did 
not differ among small (5 to 19 employees), medium (20 to 49 employees) 
and large (50 or more employees) establishments. 
•  The use of fraud prevention and detection methods was more common among 
large and medium-sized businesses than among small ones. More than 
three-quarters (76%) of large businesses reported using pre-employment 
screening as a fraud prevention measure while only 45% of small businesses 
used the same method. Similarly, 87% of large establishments conducted 
management training to prevent fraud; in small establishments, this method 
was utilized only in 69% of the cases. To detect fraud, large establishments 
used internal and external audits in 63% and 28% of the cases respectively; 
59% of them deployed detection technology in order to identify fraud.   
19	 	 Based	on	Industry	Canada	(2011).	Key Small Business Statistics,	Table	4,	p.	11.
20	 	 For	the	purpose	of	consistency	in	terminology	used	in	this	report,	we	refer	to	employee	fraud	
discussed	in	the	SFAB	as	“occupational	fraud”.
21	 	 As	presented	in	Taylore-Butts,	A.	and	Perreault,	S.	(2009).	Fraud Against Businesses in Canada: 
Results from a National Survey, Catalogue	no.	85-571-X.21
For small establishments these proportions stood at a lower level: 52%, 17% 
and 48% respectively.
3.2.2. Private Sources of Information on Incidences of Occupational Fraud 
Private sources of information on incidences of occupational fraud in Canada 
are relatively scarce. One of the best known and more comprehensive private 
sources is represented by the series of reports made public by the ACFE; 
however their primary focus is the United States. In 1996, the ACFE published 
an exploratory study on the status of occupational fraud and abuse in the United 
States; the study intended to establish baseline measures of the frequency and 
types of occupational fraud occurring in different kinds of organizations. Since 
then, the ACFE has subsequently repeated the study in 2002, 2004, 2006, 
2008 and 2010 enlarging the scope of the analysis to incorporate some specific 
regional considerations as well as expanding it to the global scale in 2010 by 
drawing information from fraud cases throughout the world.
One of the specific regional considerations undertaken by the ACFE was a study 
aiming to describe how occupational fraud is committed in Canada, identifying 
the nature of the likely perpetrators, and the main characteristics of the victim 
entities. The study was based on the survey of Canadian members of the ACFE 
who were asked to provide detailed information about the largest occupational 
fraud case investigated since January 2004. Although the study does not contain 
information on the prevalence of occupational fraud, the following findings of 
ACFE’s analysis may be pertinent to the current discussion:22
•  Some 42.2% of occupational fraud cases occurred in small businesses 
(those with less than 100 employees); businesses employing between 100 
and 999 employees accounted for 14.5% of fraud cases whereas large 
businesses with more than 1,000 employees were victims in the remaining 
43.4% of the cases.
•  Small companies suffer disproportionately large losses from occupational 
fraud with a median loss of $150,000 representing 11%23 of their annual 
sales.  That  contrasted  noticeably  with  the  $100,000  in  median  loss 
experienced by companies employing between 100 and 999 employees.
•  More  than  one  third  (35.1%)  of  occupational  fraud  cases  in  small 
business is detected through tips from employees, vendors, customers or 
anonymous sources. 
22	 	 Based	on	Peltier-Rivest,	D.	(2007).	Detecting Occupational Fraud in Canada: A Study of its Victims 
and Perpetrators,	Association	of	Certified	Fraud	Examiners.	
23	 	 Peltier-Rivest,	D.	(2009).	An Analysis of the Victims of Occupational Fraud: A Canadian Perspective,	
Journal	of	Financial	Crime,	Vol.	16,	No.	1,	p.	64-65.
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Some  Canada-specific  information  on  occupational  fraud  may  also  be 
obtained  from  a  PricewaterhouseCoopers  publication.  In  its  2009  global 
economic  crime  survey,24  PricewaterhouseCoopers  touched  upon  the  issue 
of occupational fraud, albeit only briefly. According to that survey, 47%25 of 
Canadian companies reported asset misappropriation which was also the most 
prevalent type of fraud reported. 
3.2.3.  The Lack of Consistency in the Information Available
In addition to the scarcity of information on incidences of occupational fraud 
in Canada, the existing sources do not provide a consistent picture. Statistics 
Canada’s survey suggests that only 15% of businesses experience occupational 
fraud;  however,  this  proportion  is  three  times  higher  (47%)  based  on  the 
information collected by PricewaterhouseCoopers. At the same time, Statistic 
Canada’s survey shows that the prevalence of fraudulent activities does not 
differ among establishments of different size. In turn, the ACFE study suggests 
that small businesses are much more likely to be victims of occupational fraud 
compared to their larger counterparts and experience disproportionately higher 
financial losses. 
The differences in the methodology and the scope of the studies may be the 
reason for diverging findings. As was mentioned above, Statistics Canada’s 
survey  was  focused  on  only  three  specific,  service-producing  industries. 
Although the ACFE’s analysis did not contain industry limitations, it was 
based on information derived from a relatively small number of fraud cases 
– a total of 90 occupational fraud cases were examined with 35 of those cases 
occurring in small businesses that employ less than 100 employees. Given 
the fact that some 1.12 million Canadian businesses are small,26 conclusions 
derived from a sample of 35 fraud cases may not be fully representative of 
the actual situation prevalent in the marketplace. The PricewaterhouseCoopers 
survey  may  likewise  have  been  underrepresented  given  that  the  Canadian 
sample included only 52 companies.27
Although the described sources of information on occupational fraud bear 
some shortcomings and provide somewhat diverging findings, they continue 
to  present  the  best  available  reference  materials  on  occupational  fraud  in 
Canadian business – our literature analysis yielded no other source that provides 
24	 	 PricewaterhouseCoopers	(2009).	Economic Crime in a Downturn – The 2009 Global Economic Crime 




26	 	 Industry	Canada	(2011).	Key Small Business Statistics,	July	2011,	Table	1,	p.	7.
27	 	 PricewaterhouseCoopers	(2009).	The Global Economic Crime Survey – Economic Crime in a 
Downturn,	p.	19.
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information on the prevalence of occupational fraud in Canada, leaving aside 
the discussion of the issue as it pertains to Canadian SMEs. 
Summing up the discussion above, the following points are deemed to be 
important. First, several key elements are typically present in an occupational 
fraud scheme: the scheme is clandestine, it violates the perpetrator’s duties 
to the organization, it is committed for direct or indirect financial gain of 
the perpetrator and it costs the organization assets, revenues or reserves. The 
detailed taxonomy of occupational fraud includes more than 50 distinctive types 
of fraud. Second, the nowadays popular and often used term of “white-collar 
crime” should not be bluntly interpreted as occupational fraud as it may or 
may not involve misuse of the employing organization’s resources. The profile 
of a typical white-collar perpetrator is also noticeably different from that of 
a perpetrator committing occupational fraud. Third, neither official statistics 
collected by government agencies nor information gathered by other interested 
groups and stakeholders provide a comprehensive picture of the degree of 
victimization of Canadian business by different types of fraud. Similarly, none 
of the studies conducted to date focus on fraud in SMEs.2425
Findings From CGA-Canada’s Survey 
of Presence of Occupational Fraud 
in SMEs
The  survey  commissioned  by  CGA-Canada  sought  to  examine  the  level 
of  vulnerability  of  Canadian  SMEs28  to  occupational  fraud  and  to  gather 
information on the prevalence and types of occupational fraud experienced by 
SMEs. The survey also aimed to identify prevention and detection methods 
used  by  SMEs  to  safeguard  against  occupational  fraud.  For  that  purpose, 
the survey asked respondents to reflect on the state of affairs and events that 
had occurred over the past fiscal year by examining two broad elements: (i) 
the  overall  number  of  occupational  fraud  incidents  experienced  by  SMEs 
(with particular attention to characteristics of the single largest incident of 
occupational fraud), and (ii) measures used by SMEs to prevent and detect 
incidents of occupational fraud. The findings of the survey are presented in 
this section under the two main themes identified above. Appendix A, in turn, 
contains the description of the survey methodology and questionnaire.
For the purpose of the survey, occupational fraud is understood as the use 
of one’s occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse 
or  misappropriation  of  the  employing  organization’s  resources  or  assets.29 
Direct theft where no deceit is involved is not considered fraud. An incident 
of occupational fraud is understood as either a one-time event of occupational 
fraud, or a set of events repeated over time that originate from the same source, 
which have come to the attention of the respondent company.
4.1. Incidents of Occupational Fraud
Respondents were asked to reflect on the number of incidents of occupational 
fraud experienced by their companies during the last fiscal year as well as 
to provide some details regarding the single largest incident of occupational 
fraud that took place during that year. The types of occupational fraud were 
categorized  into  six  groups  –  misappropriation  of  cash,  misappropriation 
of  inventory  or  assets,  theft  of  proprietary  information  and  intellectual 
property, assets/revenue overstatement or understatement, misrepresentation 
of  employment  credentials  or  internal  and/or  external  documents,  and 
corruption.30 Respondents were also offered an option to indicate other types 
of occupational fraud that were not included in the list of answer options.
28	 	 For	the	purpose	of	this	survey,	small	and	medium-sized	enterprises	(SMEs)	are	understood	as	those	
employing	between	5	and	499	employees.	




4.1.1. Prevalence of Occupational Fraud in SMEs
One quarter (26%) of surveyed SMEs reported to have experienced at least 
one incident of occupational fraud in the past fiscal year; and another 4% of 
respondents were not sure whether or not occupational fraud had occurred 
in their companies.31 These proportions translate into an estimated 290,000 
Canadian SMEs that were victims to occupational fraud in 2010 and another 
50,000 that do not rule out this possibility. 
Noticeable regional differences existed in the likelihood of SMEs to report 
incidents of fraud: only 16% of those surveyed in Québec told us that their 
companies encountered at least one incident of occupational fraud in the last 
fiscal year; in Ontario and British Columbia this proportion was almost twice 
higher and stood at 31% and 37% respectively.32 The company size was another 
factor that influenced the likelihood of reporting incidents of occupational 
fraud. One quarter (26%) of SMEs generating less than $5 million dollars in 
annual revenue reported to have experienced incidents of occupational fraud; 
among larger SMEs (those with annual revenues exceeding $5 million dollars) 
this proportion stood at 36%. These results held true when the size of the 
company was measured by the number of employees. 
SMEs  with  weakening  company  performance  were  also  somewhat  more 
susceptible to occupational fraud. Some 32% of companies that had experienced 
a significant decline in their financial performance in the past three years 
reported  to  have  been  subject  to  occupational  fraud.  Among  those  whose 
performance did not deteriorate, only 25% reported incidents of fraud. Such 
company characteristics as number of years in business and industry sector did 
not seem to noticeably influence the odds of reporting occupational fraud. 
The most often cited type of occupational fraud experienced by SMEs was 
misappropriation of inventory or assets: 54% of companies reporting fraud said 
they encountered at least one incident of misappropriation of inventory or assets 
in the last fiscal year. At a distant second and third most often named types 
of occupational fraud were misappropriation of cash and misrepresentation of 
employment credentials through internal or external documents – some 36% 
and 25% of SMEs respectively indicated that they experienced those types of 
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Survey respondents were provided with an option to indicate the frequency 
with which occupational fraud occurred in the last fiscal year. Although “one” 
was the most often indicated number of incidents for all types of occupational 
fraud, at least one fifth of respondents that experienced misappropriation of 
cash, inventory or assets, and corruption said that those types of fraud occurred 
four or more times in their companies in the last fiscal year.
4.1.2. Characteristics of the Single Largest Incident of Occupational Fraud
To  better  understand  the  means  of  detecting  occupational  fraud  and  its 
consequences  for  SMEs,  survey  respondents  were  asked  to  reflect  on  the 
single largest incident of occupational fraud that occurred in their companies 
in the last fiscal year. Misappropriation of inventory or assets was most often 
identified by respondents as the largest case of occupational fraud in their 
company: 34% of respondents who experienced fraud told us so. For another 
26% of SMEs that encountered fraud, misappropriation of cash was the most 
notable fraud incident. 
When surveyed companies were grouped into smaller SMEs (those generating 
less than $5 million in annual revenue) and larger SMEs (those generating 
$5 million and more in annual revenue), some differences were observed 
in  the  type  of  occupational  fraud  identified  as  the  single  largest  incident. 
For instance, misappropriation of inventory or assets was much more often 
identified as the most notable fraud episode by larger SMEs than was the case 
for smaller SMEs. In turn, smaller SMEs were more likely than larger SMEs 
to report misrepresentation of employment credentials, and internal or external 
documents as the single largest incident of fraud (Figure 2). 
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Most  often,  the  single  largest  incident  of  occupational  fraud  was  exposed 
thanks to employees. Some 24% of SMEs that experienced occupational fraud 
indicated that the single largest case of fraud was uncovered as it was reported 
by  employees.  For  another  22%  of  respondents,  the  single  largest  fraud 
incident was identified by internal audit and/or compliance personnel, whereas 
it was reported by managers, or customers and business contacts respectively 
in 16% and 10% of the cases. Three other methods of fraud detection – data 
mining and analysis, surprise controls, and external auditors – were noticeably 
less frequent in leading to detecting the largest incident of fraud. It may be 
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Figure 2 – Type of the Single Largest Incident of Occupational 
Fraud Experienced by SMEs
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Note: Due to the relatively small sample size of the “SMEs with annual revenue of $5 million and more” 
  category, the percentages presented in the ￿gure above should be viewed as indicative of the 
  relative prevalence of different types of occupational fraud rather than as a precise measurement 
  of the frequency of fraud occurrence.
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4.1.3. Impact of Occupational Fraud on SMEs
Financial losses incurred by SMEs due to incidents of reported occupational 
fraud over the last fiscal year were not very substantial. For more than half 
(55%) of SMEs that experienced occupational fraud, financial losses associated 
with fraud did not exceed $1,000; another 26% of companies assessed that their 
losses ranged between $1,000 and $5,000. Only 7% of SMEs experiencing 
occupational fraud said that their financial losses exceeded $25,000 (Figure 3); 
and only two companies (or less than 1% of those experiencing fraud) reported 
an estimated loss of more than $200,000. 
The company size and sector of operations were two company characteristics 
that were somewhat likely to affect the extent of financial losses experienced 
by SMEs resulting from occupational fraud. For instance, SMEs with annual 
revenue in excess of $5 million reported losses greater than $25,000 twice 
more often compared with SMEs generating less than $5 million in annual 
revenues (12% vs. 6%). These results held true when the size of the company 
was measured by the number of employees. Similarly, SMEs operating in the 
service-producing industries were three times more likely to report losses 
in  excess  of  $25,000  compared  to  SMEs  affiliated  with  goods-producing 
industries.  However,  these  differences  did  not  change  the  main  trend: 
regardless of the company’s characteristics, more than half of respondents that 
experienced fraud in the last fiscal year assessed their losses as fairly modest 
– not exceeding $1,000. 
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It is worth noting that the findings of CGA-Canada’s survey regarding the 
scale of financial losses incurred due to occupational fraud differ markedly 
compared to findings of the Canada-specific study undertaken by the ACFE in 
2007. According to the ACFE’s data, the median, occupational fraud-related 
financial loss of a small business with less than 100 employees is $150,00033 
whereas the average loss suffered by a small business is $1,188,462.34 Although 
the exact cause of the discrepancy cannot be identified, a number of possible 
explanations may be offered. For instance, information regarding monetary 
impact of fraud may be seen as sensitive by businesses and thus not fully 
reflected in the survey that collects data directly from business establishments 
which was the case of CGA-Canada’s survey. The ACFE survey did not face 
this limitation as the information was provided by fraud examiners who may 
be seen as a more neutral party than victimized businesses when it comes to 
assessing the consequences of fraud incidents. On the other hand, the ACFE 
survey did not seek to collect information from a representative sample of 
respondents, but rather from fraud examiners who were willing to provide 
information. As such, certain predispositions of survey participants due to self-
selection may have disproportionately transmuted in the size of fraud cases 
described. Moreover, the ACFE survey assessed financial losses based on the 
information regarding the largest fraud case investigated by respondents. This, 
naturally, may lead to an overestimation of losses when they are generalized 
from the level of an individual case to the level of the sector.
In addition to the financial consequences of fraud, survey respondents were 
also asked to reflect on other negative effects associated with occupational 
fraud. As seen from the top chart of Figure 4, the negative impact on staff 
morale was by far the most often identified aspect of business that was affected 
by occupational fraud – 61% of SMEs that experienced fraud in the last fiscal 
year agreed. At a noticeable distance, such elements as business relationships, 
company’s  reputation,  public  and  client  trust  and  company’s  value  were 
indicated by at least one fifth of respondents as other non-financial negative 
consequences of occupational fraud. The majority of respondents that chose 
the “Other” answer option, noted that occupational fraud experienced by their 
companies affected management’s confidence in staff. 
The likelihood of respondents to report certain aspects of business as negatively 
affected  by  occupational  fraud  fluctuated  depending  on  the  company’s 
characteristics. The age of business was particularly influential in this regard. 
As  seen  from  the  bottom  chart  of  Figure  4,  younger  SMEs  were  at  least 
twice more likely than their older counterparts to feel that occupational fraud 
33	 	 Peltier-Rivest,	D.	(2007).	Detecting Occupational Fraud in Canada: A Study of its Victims and 
Perpetrators,	ACFE,	p.	18.
34	 	 Peltier-Rivest,	D.	(2009).	An Analysis of the Victims of Occupational Fraud: A Canadian Perspective,	
Journal	of	Financial	Crime,	Vol.	16,	No.	1,	p.	65.
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negatively affected business relationships and company value. Larger SMEs 
(those employing between 20 and 499 employees) felt stronger than smaller 
SMEs employing 5 to 19 employees that occupational fraud negatively affects 
staff moral and company reputation: the proportion of respondents indicating 
those answer options were 67% vs. 58% and 30% vs. 21% respectively. In turn, 
SMEs operating in goods-producing industries were more likely than their 
services-producing counterparts to experience a negative impact on company 
value (29% vs. 20% respectively). 
Figure 4 – Aspects of Business Negatively Affected due to 
Occupational Fraud
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Once an incident of occupational fraud is uncovered, some adjustments may 
reasonably be expected to the company’s internal policies and practices aiming 
at preventing similar incidents in the future. The survey asked SMEs that 
experienced occupational fraud in the last fiscal year to identify those changes. 
The majority (57%) of respondents said that their companies revised disciplinary 
actions to be administered in the case of fraud. The other two most often cited 
changes related to modifying protocols for hiring and retaining employees, and 
adjusting policies and channels for reporting employees’ concerns about fraud: 
45% and 42% of respondents respectively indicated those changes (top chart 
of Figure 5). Two additional measures – strengthening the system of internal 
controls and improving physical safeguards to secure company assets – were 
most often mentioned by respondents as “other” policies and practices that 
were adjusted as a result of detected occupational fraud.
When companies were grouped into smaller SMEs (those employing between 
5 and 19 employees) and larger SMEs (those with 20 to 499 employees), a 
number of differences emerged in the type of policies that were adjusted as 
a result of occupational fraud. For instance, smaller SMEs accorded much 
greater  attention  to  revising  protocols  for  hiring  and  retaining  employees 
(58% vs. 32% respectively) when compared to larger SMEs. Similarly, smaller 
SMEs were much more likely to modify the company’s code of ethics and 
conduct  than  was  the  case  with  larger  SMEs,  and  to  alter  the  quantity/
frequency of fraud awareness and ethics training among employees (bottom   
chart of Figure 5). The sector of company’s operations somewhat affected 
the likelihood of revising company’s policies related to segregation of duties: 
48% of goods-producing SMEs said that they adjusted these policies as a 
result of incidents of occupational fraud. Among services-producing SMEs 
this proportion stood at 37%.
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Figure 5 – Internal Policies and Practices Revised as a Result 
of Occupational Fraud
% of SMEs reporting occupational fraud
Protocol establishing investigation procedures
Quantity/frequency of fraud awareness and
 ethics training among employees
Quantity/frequency of fraud awareness and
 ethics training among management
Fraud response plan
Other
Policy regarding ￿nacial review/reconciliation
Company’s code of ethics and conduct
Protocol establishing segregation of duties
Policies and channels for reporting employees’
 concerns about fraud
Protocols for hiring and retaining employees
Disciplinary actions to be administered












0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
% of SMEs reporting occupational fraud in each group
Protocol establishing investigation procedures
Quantity/frequency of fraud awareness and
 ethics training among employees
Quantity/frequency of fraud awareness and
 ethics training among management
Fraud response plan
Other
Policy regarding ￿nacial review/reconciliation
Company’s code of ethics and conduct
Protocol establishing segregation of duties
Policies and channels for reporting employees’
 concerns about fraud
Protocols for hiring and retaining employees
Disciplinary actions to be administered























0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
SMEs with 5 to 19 employees
SMEs with 20 to 499 employees34
4.2. Occupational Fraud Prevention and Detection
All survey respondents – including those who reported incidents of occupational 
fraud, but also those who did not – were asked to reflect on the measures that 
were in place in their companies in the last fiscal year aimed at prevention and 
detection of incidents of occupational fraud.
4.2.1. Level of Risk of Occupational Fraud
Overall, surveyed respondents did not think that occupational fraud presents 
a  significant  peril  for  their  companies.  Only  5%  of  SMEs  gauged  that 
occupational fraud poses a high risk for them, another 21% thought that the 
risk is moderate while the majority (74%) of surveyed SMEs believed that their 
exposure to the risk of occupational fraud is low. 
Some  difference  in  respondents’  perception  of  risk  existed  depending  on 
company characteristics. The most notable difference appeared when surveyed 
SMEs were grouped into those that have experienced occupational fraud in the 
last fiscal year and those which did not. SMEs that encountered at least one 
incident of occupational fraud were more than twice more likely to gauge the 
risk of occupational fraud as either high or moderate; however, the majority 
(53%) still believed that occupational fraud posed a low risk for their businesses 
(Figure 6). 
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A number of other divergences in respondents’ perceptions of the level of fraud 
risk also existed. For instance, size of the company was of some influence: 
while 25% of larger SMEs (those with 20 to 499 employees) assessed the level 
of risk of occupational fraud as moderate rather than low, only 19% of smaller 
SMEs (those with 5 to 19 employees) did so. Younger companies (those that have 
been in business for 1 to 15 years) were twice more likely to gauge the risk of 
occupational fraud as high compared to more established SMEs that have been 
in operation for more than 15 years. Companies with weakening performance 
were also more alert to the risk of occupational fraud: some 10% of SMEs 
that had experienced a significant decline in their financial performance in the 
past three years gauged the risk of occupational fraud as high, whereas only 
4% of companies with stable or improving performance told us so. Such other 
company characteristics as industry sector, revenue size, province of operations, 
and  rapid  expansion  of  business  did  not  noticeably  influence  respondents’ 
perceptions regarding the level of risk posed by occupational fraud. 
The survey asked respondents to reflect on the types of occupational fraud 
that their companies may potentially be susceptible to. One quarter (26%) of 
surveyed SMEs do not think they are vulnerable to any of the indicated types 
of occupational fraud. Respondents that deemed their companies as susceptible 
to occupational fraud, most often indicated misappropriation of inventory or 
assets as the point of vulnerability: 45% of respondents said so. Some 32% of 
surveyed thought that their company was susceptible to misappropriation of 
cash while 31% of respondents felt that theft of proprietary information and 
intellectual property may be a threat to their business (top chart of Figure 7). 
Misuse of company time was most often identified by survey respondents as the 
“other” type of occupational fraud to which their business may be susceptible. 
These perceptions of the relative vulnerability to different types of occupational 
fraud are well aligned with the types of fraud actually experienced by some of 
the surveyed companies (as discussed in Figure 1). 
Grouping surveyed SMEs into two categories – those that have experienced 
occupational fraud in the last fiscal year, and those that have not – reveals 
an interesting facet of the perceived vulnerability. Although ranking of the 
types of occupational fraud to which the company may be susceptible did not 
vary considerably from one group to the other, the proportion of respondents 
gauging their company as vulnerable to a given type of fraud was much higher 
among SMEs that have experienced occupational fraud than among those that 
did not (bottom chart of Figure 7). That speaks to the increased awareness of 
risks and vulnerability to fraudulent actions in SMEs that have happened to 
experience occupational fraud first hand. 
26% of surveyed SMEs 
do not think they are 
vulnerable to any type  
of occupational fraud36
Survey  respondents  were  asked  whether  or  not  their  company  undertakes 
periodic (e.g. monthly, quarterly, annual) assessments of risks of occupational 
fraud. Less than half (41%) of the surveyed SMEs engage in such an exercise 
while the majority (59%) do not. The likelihood of undertaking a periodic 
assessment of risks was somewhat influenced by the company’s perception 
of the level of its exposure to occupational fraud. For instance, 57% of those 
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Figure 7 – Types of Occupational Fraud to which Companies 
Are Perceived to Be Susceptible
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they carry out periodic risk assessment. Among companies that gauge the risk 
of occupational fraud as low, that proportion stood at only 39%.
The size and the sector affiliation were two other factors that also played a role 
in companies’ propensity to conduct periodic assessment of risk of occupational 
fraud. Some 38% of smaller SMEs (those with annual revenue under $5 million) 
agreed that undertaking a periodic risk assessment is part of their company’s 
practice. This proportion was as high as 57% among companies generating more 
than $5 million in annual revenue. Similarly, companies with larger numbers of 
employees and those operating in goods-producing industries were more likely 
to conduct periodic assessment of risks of occupational fraud than their smaller 
counterparts or those operating in services-producing industries. Whether or 
not the respondent’s company has experienced incidents of occupational fraud 
in the last fiscal year did not seem to affect the likelihood of SMEs to engage in 
periodic risk assessment activity.
Results of the survey revealed that SMEs preparedness to respond to occupational 
fraud is even lower than their involvement in periodic assessment of the fraud 
risk: only one fifth (20%) of all surveyed SMEs had a Fraud Response Plan 
while the overwhelming majority (80%) did not. Two factors – size of the 
company and past experience with occupational fraud – affected the company’s 
attitude in this matter. Larger SMEs, as well as those that encountered fraud, 
were more likely to have a Fraud Response Plan. More specifically, 29% of 
larger SMEs (those with more than $5 million in annual revenues) and 26% of 
SMEs that experienced fraud had a Fraud Response Plan in their organizations. 
This proportion was noticeably lower (18% and 19% respectively) for those 
companies generating less than $5 million in annual revenues and those that did 
not report an occupational fraud in the last fiscal year.
4.2.2. Fraud Prevention Measures
Survey respondents were offered a list of nine possible methods and techniques 
used to prevent occupational fraud and were asked to identify those that were 
in place in their companies in the last fiscal year. Although three quarters of 
the surveyed companies believed that occupational fraud poses an only low 
risk to their business, all but 2% of respondents said their company employed 
at least one method of occupational fraud prevention. As seen from the top 
chart of Figure 8, the two most often utilized techniques of occupational fraud 
prevention are ensuring that accounting procedures are clear and uniform, 
and using frequent financial reviews and/or reconciliations. Four in 5 surveyed 
SMEs  relied  on  these  fraud  prevention  measures.  Some  three  quarters  of 
surveyed companies used such fraud prevention measures as physical safeguards 
to secure company assets, segregation of duties and authorization policies for 
transactions, and pre-employment screening of employees. 
80% of surveyed  
SMEs do not have a 
Fraud Response Plan38
As was mentioned, only very few of the surveyed SMEs did not use any fraud 
prevention measures. Those that did were also highly likely to have more than 
one measure in place. Some 7% of respondents said that their companies rely 
on all nine fraud prevention measures that were offered as answer options; 
nearly half (48%) revealed that their companies use a mix of six to eight fraud 
prevention measures; and only in 15% of the cases, SMEs had three or less 
measures in place.
Mandatory job or assignment rotation/
mandatory vacations
Fraud awareness and ethics training
 among management
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Figure 8 – Occupational Fraud Prevention Measures and 
Techniques Used by SMEs
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The size of the company is particularly influential when it comes to whether 
or not the company uses certain fraud prevention measures. When surveyed 
companies were divided into two categories – larger SMEs (those with 20 
to 499 employees) and smaller SMEs (those with 5 to 19 employees), larger 
SMEs were more likely to have any given fraud prevention measure in place. 
The difference was particularly noticeable regarding having and enforcing the 
formal code of employee conduct, segregating duties, undertaking mandatory 
job or assignment rotation, and having in place physical safeguards to secure 
company assets (bottom chart of Figure 8). These differences remained constant 
when companies were grouped into smaller and larger SMEs based on the 
levels of their annual revenues. 
Whether or not SMEs experienced incidents of occupational fraud in the last 
fiscal year did not noticeably affected the likelihood of the company to utilize 
fraud prevention measures. One exception though, is worth mentioning: some 
72% of companies that have experienced occupational fraud said they had in 
place and enforced a formal code of employee conduct, whereas a somewhat 
lower proportion (63%) of companies that did not experience fraud reported 
using this fraud prevention measure. Some regional differences also existed. 
For instance, Québec respondents were consistently less likely to report using 
any of the identified fraud prevention measures compared to Canada overall. 
A number of other provincial variations were also observed; however, with 
no particular pattern. In turn, such company characteristics as the number of 
years in business and industry sector did not influence company’s likelihood of 
having fraud prevention measures in place.
4.2.3. Fraud Detection Measures
Survey respondents were offered a list of six possible methods and techniques 
of detecting occupational fraud and asked to identify those that were in place 
in their companies in the last fiscal year. Some 11% of SMEs said they did 
not use any fraud detection measures. Among those who had at least one 
detection measure in place, the majority (69%) said they relied on the system 
of monitoring and safeguarding assets as part of their fraud detection strategy. 
The second and third most often used techniques were internal and external 
auditors with 59% and 49% of SMEs choosing those answer options (top chart 
of Figure 9). The surveyed companies that used fraud detection techniques 
were somewhat equally divided (52% vs. 48%) into those using only few 
techniques (i.e. between one and three) and those which used a full range of 
detection methods (i.e. more than four).
11% of SMEs do not 
use any fraud detection 
measures40
Similar to fraud prevention measures, the likelihood of companies having 
fraud detection measures in place was notably influenced by the size of the 
company. Although the ranking of measures was similar for larger and smaller 
SMEs (those with 5 to 19 and 20 to 499 employees respectively), the frequency 
with which those measures were imbedded into companies’ business strategies 
was evidently higher among larger SMEs when compared to their smaller 
Other
None
Use of data mining and statistical techniques
 to analyze patterns of business activities
Surprise controls




System of monitoring and safeguarding assets
Figure 9 – Occupational Fraud Detection Measures and
Techniques Used by SMEs
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counterparts (bottom chart of Figure 9). These differences remained constant 
when companies were grouped into smaller and larger SMEs based on the 
levels of their annual revenues.
Occupational  fraud  detection  measures  utilized  by  companies  that  have 
experienced fraud in the last fiscal year did not seem to differ significantly 
compared to companies that did not report fraud – the hierarchy of the most 
often used measures was similar for both groups. However, the frequency with 
which certain measures were incorporated in companies’ operations somewhat 
varied as SMEs that experienced fraud were more likely to have internal audit 
and surprise controls as measures applied to detect occupational fraud. 
A certain disconnect may be observed between fraud detection methods that 
were most often used by SMEs and those that have most often led to uncovering 
actual incidents of fraud. For instance, only 39% of surveyed SMEs had in 
place systems that allow employees to report alleged violations (e.g. fraud 
hotline or whistleblowing provisions). At the same time, when companies were 
asked to reflect on the method of the single largest incident of fraud that was 
uncovered, the most often indicated option was ‘reported by employees’ – 24% 
of respondents that experienced fraud agreed. SMEs may also be somewhat 
over-relying on external audit as a fraud detection measure. Nearly half (49%) 
of the surveyed SMEs indicated external audit as part of their fraud detection 
strategy; however, only 3% of companies that experienced occupational fraud 
in the last fiscal year uncovered the single largest fraud case through external 
auditor’s examination.
4.2.4. Need for Improvement of Fraud Prevention and Detection Measures
Although  only  5%  of  surveyed  SMEs  thought  of  occupational  fraud  as 
posing a high risk for their businesses, nearly one third (31%) of respondents 
agreed that their company needed a significant improvement in the area of 
occupational  fraud  prevention  and/or  detection.  Nevertheless,  the  majority 
of respondents (60%) did not think that a significant improvement is needed, 
whereas another 9% neither agreed nor disagreed with this proposition. Not 
all survey respondents who thought that their company needs to strengthen 
fraud prevention measures also thought that a similar need exists in the area of 
fraud detection. Overall, some 75% of those who agreed that improvements are 
needed thought the changes are necessary in both areas. 
Some 18% of surveyed SMEs told us that resources they allocate to prevention 
and  detection  of  occupational  fraud  have  noticeably  declined  in  the  past 
3 years. Respondents’ perceptions of whether or not improvements are needed 
to their fraud prevention and detection measures were noticeably influenced 
by  the  decline  in  resources  allocated  to  those  measures.  As  seen  from 
31% of respondents 
agreed that their 
company needed a 
significant improvement in 
the area of occupational 
fraud prevention and/or 
detection42
Figure 10, SMEs that have experienced a reduction in resources allocated to 
fraud prevention and detection were much more likely to report the need of 
significant improvement in those areas. Similarly, SMEs that have experienced 
incidents of occupational fraud in the last fiscal year were also markedly more 
likely to agree that they need improvements in fraud prevention and detection.
Another  factor  that  influenced  SMEs  perception  regarding  the  need  for 
improvement in fraud prevention and detection policies was the pace of the 
company’s growth. Some 43% of surveyed respondents suggested that their 
company had been rapidly expanding and diversifying in the past three year. 
The rapidly growing SMEs assessed more often their fraud prevention and 
Figure 10 – Need for a Signi￿cant Improvement in Occupational 
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retention  policies  as  needing  improvement.  Specifically,  40%  of  rapidly 
expanding SMEs agreed with the idea that their company needs a significant 
improvement in the area of occupational fraud detection compared to only 
21% of SMEs that did not see a rapid expansion of their businesses. A similar 
divergence in opinion was observed regarding the need for improvement in 
fraud prevention measures.
Some regional differences were observed in respondents’ perceptions regarding 
the need for improvement in fraud prevention/detection measures. As little as 
24% of surveyed SMEs in Ontario, but as many as 44% of Québec SMEs 
agreed that they need a significant improvement in the area of occupational 
fraud prevention compared to the Canadian average of 31%. The differences in 
views were very similar regarding the need of improvement in fraud detection 
measures. Such company characteristics as the size and industry sector did 
not noticeably influence the likelihood of assessing company’s prevention and 
detection measures as being in need of significant revamping.
Summing  up  the  discussion  above,  the  following  points  are  deemed  most 
important.  First,  the  majority  of  SMEs  believe  that  their  exposure  to  the 
risk of occupational fraud is low; however, more than one quarter of SMEs 
experienced incidents of occupational fraud in the last fiscal year. Second, 
financial  losses  incurred  by  SMEs  due  to  incidents  of  occupational  fraud 
are not excessively large with the majority of cases not exceeding $1,000; 
however, for a large number of victims, fraud incidents also negatively affect 
staff morale, business relationships, company reputation and public / client 
trust. Third, less than half of SMEs undertake periodic assessments of risks 
of occupational fraud; SMEs preparedness to respond to occupational fraud is 
even lower as the overwhelming majority do not have a Fraud Response Plan. 
Fourth, nearly all SMEs use some method of occupational fraud prevention; 
however 1 in 10 companies does not have any fraud detection measures in 
place. Moreover, certain disconnects may be observed between fraud detection 
methods that are most often used by SMEs and those that most often lead to 
uncovering actual incidents of fraud. Fifth, quite often, noticeable differences 
in SMEs experience with occupational fraud exist depending on the company 
size, industry affiliation, geographic location, and the number of years of being 
in business.4445
Should the Modest Level of 
Financial Losses From Occupational 
Fraud Be Comforting?
As  discussed  in  Section  4,  the  overwhelming  majority  (81%)  of  surveyed 
SMEs that experienced incidents of occupational fraud in the last fiscal year 
reported that the financial losses incurred in that year due to fraud did not 
exceed $5,000. This translates into an average annual loss of approximately 
$10,90035 per each victimized SME. For the Canadian economy as a whole, 
such level of losses may represent a substantial amount – some $3.2 billion or 
approximately the amount the federal government spends annually on the GST 
credit for lower-income families.36 However, for an individual SME this level 
of losses could probably be seen as tolerable (although undesirable). As the 
business performance and the business bottom line continues to be assessed 
in monetary terms, the low level of financial losses caused by the occupational 
fraud may lead some observers to conclude that occupational fraud does not 
represent a significant problem for the SME sector. In paragraphs that follow, 
we bring up additional considerations to critically examine this line of thinking. 
5.1. Is the Level of Financial Losses Truly Low?
The existence of such factors as undetected and underreported cases of fraud, 
high turnover of SMEs and certain limitations of the data collection design may 
suggest that the estimates of financial losses provided by the CGA-Canada’s 
survey respondents may be below the levels of losses actually sustained. These 
factors are further considered below.
The length of time that the fraud scheme can last before being detected may 
be quite substantial. The ACFE estimates that the median time period from 
the moment occupational fraud first occurs to the moment it is uncovered is 
18 months. In cases when fraud involves fraudulent statements, the median 
duration of the perpetration is even longer – 27 months.37 As fraud remains 
undetected  until  the  moment  it  is  uncovered,  the  losses  associated  with 
undetected fraud are also not known to the organization until the moment the 
fraud is exposed. Moreover, the longer an occupational fraud goes undetected, 
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a successful fraud (i.e. undetected fraud), the likelihood of exposing this fraud 
sometime in the future is very low as most fraud detection methods focus 
on current, rather than past, fraudulent activity.38 As such, the presence of 
undetected cases of occupational fraud would lead to an underestimation of 
financial losses experienced by the victimized organization. 
As was seen in Section 4, some 11% of surveyed SMEs do not have any fraud 
detection measures in place. Moreover, the detection measures that are in place 
may not always be the most efficient ones as certain discrepancy is observed 
between fraud detection methods that are most often used by SMEs and those 
that most often lead to uncovering actual incidents of fraud. It is then highly 
possible that at least some proportion of occupational fraud that victimizes 
SMEs remains undetected and thus unaccounted for in terms of financial 
losses estimated by businesses.
Another factor that may lead to an underestimation of the scale of financial 
losses experienced by SMEs due to occupational fraud is underreporting of 
fraud. Consultations conducted by Statistics Canada with representatives of law 
enforcement, government and the private sector regarding data collection on 
fraud showed that the ability of businesses to share fraud-related information 
may be somewhat diminished as incidents of fraud are not always tracked in 
the company records. The fear of jeopardizing the company’s reputation, or the 
perceived insignificance of benefits of recording/reporting fraud relative to the 
size of the losses are two other reasons that may negatively affect businesses 
response rate regarding the financial consequences of fraud experienced.39 
Moreover, some businesses are believed to accept occasional occupational 
fraud as a natural part of doing business40 and thus would not be reporting 
those expenses as losses.
The high turnover of SMEs may also affect the accuracy of the estimates of 
occupational fraud related financial losses. Unlike large businesses that are 
characterized by a relative stability and longer life span, thousands of SMEs 
enter and exit the marketplace every year. The turnover among small business 
is roughly 10% annually; some 15% of SMEs do not survive one full year of 
operation whereas another 23% will typically leave the marketplace within 
three years of their establishment.41 High turnover, the stress of maintaining 
the business and the struggle for the niche in the marketplace makes “younger” 
SMEs less likely to participate in voluntary data collection initiatives. At the 
38	 	 Barnes,	P.	and	Webb,	J.	(2005).	Reducing an Organization’s Susceptibility to Occupational Fraud: 
Factors Affecting its Likelihood and Size,	BDE	Global,	p.	7.
39	 	 Statistics	Canada	(2005).	A Feasibility Report on Improving the Measurement of Fraud in Canada,	
Catalogue	no.	85-569-XIE,	p.	20-22
40	 	 Russell,	S.	G.	(1999).	Organisations as Victims of Fraud, and How They Deal with It,	Trends	and	Issues	
in	Crime	and	Criminal	Justice.	No.	127.
41	 	 Industry	Canada	(2011).	Key Small Business Statistics,	p.	12-14.
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same time, it is probably the younger companies that are more vulnerable 
and susceptible to occupational fraud as the development and introduction 
of fraud prevention and detection measures in such companies takes place 
simultaneously with the company and staff growth and may or may not be 
effective in the early stages of company’s development.
When data is collected by the means of a survey, underreporting of financial 
losses may also be caused by the survey design. Often, the answer options 
regarding financial losses encountered due to fraud are presented to respondents 
as a range of two values. As such, the actual amount of respondent’s losses 
within that range remains unknown, whereas assuming a mid-point answer for 
all respondents may ignore the possibility that the distribution of losses is tilted 
towards the upper limit of the suggested range.
Given  the  reasons  presented  above,  additional  losses  sustained  by  SMEs 
victimized  by  occupational  fraud  may  in  fact  be  present  in  the  economy; 
however, not accounted for in the data and information available. The danger 
of this information gap goes beyond the simple limitations of the data. It may 
divert the attention of business owners, the government and law enforcement 
agencies towards recognizable and often more anticipated external fraud and/
or highly visible cases of white-collar crime leaving the issues pertinent to 
occupational fraud in SMEs largely overshadowed. 
5.2. Importance of Non-financial Consequences of Occupational Fraud
As  was  seen  in  Section  4,  the  majority  (61%)  of  SMEs  that  experienced 
occupational  fraud  in  the  last  fiscal  year  said  that  the  fraudulent  activity 
negatively  affected  staff  morale.  Two  subsequent  consequences  may  be 
associated with this effect. Diminished ethical principles due to the decline 
in staff morale may (i) create a fertile environment for reoccurrence of fraud, 
and  (ii)  impede  the  prospects  of  a  company’s  growth  through  improving 
sophistication of operations and strategy.
It is assumed that perceived punitive action influences personal behaviour. In 
the case of occupational fraud, this implies that the magnitude of employee 
misconduct relates to both the perceived certainty and severity of organizational 
sanctions.42 Businesses are known to have low rates of reporting fraud incidents 
to  police.  For  instance,  nearly  half  of  retail  and  insurance  establishments 
never or only rarely notify law enforcement in cases of fraud; among small 
businesses, this proportion is three times lower. Likewise, civil courts are not 
frequently used to resolve incidents of fraud and recover losses. The magnitude 
of fraud which is often seen as too minor is the most commonly cited reason 
42	 	 Strand,	C.A.	et	al	(2000).	Corporate Training Assessment Technique: Risk Factors Associated with 
Misappropriation of Assets,	Journal	of	Forensic	Accounting,	Vol.	1	(2000),	p.	196.
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for not involving law enforcement in the fraud investigation and punishment.43 
Although this line of business behaviour may well be understandable, the relative 
softness of punishment actions may affect employees’ perceptions regarding the 
risk of sanctions and thus may increase the likelihood of their engagement in 
fraudulent activities. This, subsequently, increases the SMEs’ risk of additional 
financial losses and further erode ethical stand of the organization.
Creating an efficient and sophisticated production process allows SMEs to 
embark growth opportunity and greater productivity. The most frequent method 
of improving efficiency and increasing the sophistication of the production 
processes is through greater reliance on employees, improved infrastructure, 
better  suppliers,  and  stronger  competitive  pressure.  However,  the  success 
of the growth strategy of an SME is often dependent on the ability of the 
owner to delegate authority to other employees within the firm, or to hire new 
personnel who can assume additional positions and responsibilities. Overall, 
the reluctance of owner-managers to relinquish their personal control over 
the firm is fairly common.44 In cases when a business becomes victimized by 
incidents of occupational fraud, diminished staff morale may aggravate even 
further the owner’s unwillingness to dilute the power and to delegate. As such, 
important growth opportunities may be foregone as an indirect consequence 
of occupational fraud.
The  other  non-financial  consequences  of  occupational  fraud  –  diminished 
company value, eroded company reputation, damaged business relationships, 
and undermined public and client trust – may likewise create strong impediments 
to SMEs growth and alter the trajectory of business development which could 
have taken place in the absence of incidents of occupational fraud.
Summing up the discussion above, the following points are deemed to be 
important. First, the average level of reported financial losses incurred due to 
occupational fraud by an individual SME is not large by any standard. As such, 
the likely inference may be that occupational fraud does not represent a significant 
problem for the SME sector. Second, a number of additional considerations may 
be of value when assessing the seriousness of the issue of occupational fraud for 
the SME sector. Those considerations are prompted by the likely underestimation 
of the level of financial losses sustained by SMEs due to occupational fraud, and 
by the importance of the indirect impact of non-financial consequences of fraud 
inflicted on the company’s growth and development. Third, a more thorough 
analysis may be warranted prior to solidifying the conclusion that occupational 
fraud does not represent a significant problem for the SMEs sector.
43	 	 Taylor-Butts,	A.	and	Perreault,	S.	(2009).	Fraud Against Businesses in Canada: Results from a National 
Survey, Statistics	Canada,	Catalogue	no.	85-571-X,	p.	12-14,	16.
44	 	 Papadaki,	E.	and	Cham,	B.	(2002).	Growth Determinants of Micro-Businesses in Canada,	Industry	
Canada,	p. 29.
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Conclusions
The analysis in the preceding sections has intended to provide valuable insights 
into the level of vulnerability of Canadian SMEs to occupational fraud, types 
of occupational fraud experienced by SMEs and the extent to which fraud 
prevention and detection methods are used by SMEs to safeguard against 
occupational fraud. During this examination, a number of contentions have 
been exposed.
Overall, SMEs are not highly concerned with issues related to occupational 
fraud; the lack of first-hand experience with occupational fraud may be 
the largest contributing factor 
Only a portion of SMEs incorporate regular assessment of risks of occupational 
fraud into their business strategies and thus are well positioned to gauge the 
likelihood of occurring of this type of fraud in their organizations. Despite the 
limited engagement in risk assessment, the majority of SMEs tend to think 
that their exposure to risk of fraud is low; likewise, many do not gauge their 
organization as being predisposed to any particular type of occupational fraud. 
Given this attitude, it is not surprising that SMEs tend to accord little attention 
to developing and updating a Fraud Response Plan which would guide staff and 
management in cases when fraud has been detected or is suspected. A visible 
proportion of SMEs also accord rather little consideration to fraud detection 
measures – in fact, some SMEs have no such measures in place. 
The  awareness  of  risks  and  implications  of  occupational  fraud  improves 
among SMEs that recently have acknowledged incidents of fraud. Previously 
victimized  SMEs  are  more  likely  to  understand  their  vulnerabilities  to 
occupational fraud, and formalize the response policies into a Fraud Response 
Plan. The recognition of the need for improvements in fraud prevention and 
detection measures is also more prominent among recently victimized SMEs. 
As such, the overall low level of concern regarding occupational fraud exhibited 
by SMEs may, at least partially, be caused by the lack of first-hand experience 
with this type of fraud.
650
The level of financial losses incurred by SMEs due to occupational fraud 
suggests that this type of fraud does not present a significant problem for 
the SME sector; however such an inference may benefit from additional 
considerations
One quarter of SMEs are victimized by occupational fraud annually. Whether 
this proportion should be seen as high or low is a rather judgemental call. In 
turn, the level of financial losses incurred due to occupational fraud may be a 
more objective indicator when weighing the seriousness of this issue for the 
SMEs sector. The analysis shows that losses incurred by individual SMEs are 
rather low and on average should not be detrimental to their business. This 
line of thinking strongly suggests that occupational fraud does not represent a 
significant problem for the SME sector.
A number of additional considerations, however, may also be of value. The 
estimates of financial losses derived in this report may be below the levels of 
losses actually sustained: undetected and underreported cases of fraud, high 
turnover of SMEs, particularly in newer firms, and certain limitations of the 
data collection design are all contributing factors. Moreover, such non-financial 
negative consequences of occupational fraud as eroded staff morale, diminished 
company value, blemished company reputation, damaged business relationships, 
and undermined public and client trust are not quantified and not included in 
the estimate of financial losses incurred due to occupational fraud. However, 
the impact of these non-financial implications may be substantial, particularly 
in terms of a company’s ability to expand and to develop its business.
A multi-faceted information gap regarding the presence and impact of 
occupational fraud on SMEs continues to exist
Little official statistics exist that can be used to fully understand the nature 
of business fraud and its victims, leaving aside such a rather narrow issue as 
victimization of Canadian SMEs by occupational fraud. Publicly available 
information collected by private stakeholders is valuable, but carries certain 
limitations and may or may not accurately depict the prevalence and seriousness 
of occupational fraud. In addition to the scarcity of information on incidences 
of  occupational  fraud,  the  existing  sources  do  not  provide  a  consistent 
picture. The findings regarding the scale of financial losses incurred due to 
occupational fraud also differ markedly depending on the source. At the same 
time, the importance of non-financial consequences of occupational fraud is 
often overlooked and seldom measured in material terms even though such 
consequences may be as important for business practices as financial losses 
sustained. Last but not least, noticeable regional differences are observed but 
not well explained or examined. 51
Room for improvement on issues of occupational fraud exists for both 
businesses and the government
SMEs fare fairly well when it comes to the use of fraud prevention measures. 
Fraud detection, though, remains somewhat overlooked. Incorporating fraud 
prevention measures in the business strategy is a constructive approach to 
safeguarding against the risks of occupational fraud. However, insufficient 
attention  to  fraud  detection  techniques  may  be  dodgy  particularly  in  the 
environment when fraudulent activities are constantly modified and redefined. 
Greater use and diversification of fraud detection measures may accord SMEs 
a better protection from the risks of occupational fraud. A critical assessment 
of fraud detection techniques that are the most suitable for the structure and the 
nature of a particular business may also be important. 
Another area of improvement may be found in re-balancing efforts between 
prevention/detection of occupational fraud, and company’s ability to respond 
to fraud. As highlighted in this paper, only some companies have policies in 
place to guide staff and management actions once fraud is detected. 
As the real scope and seriousness of occupational fraud in SMEs is not fully 
known, the ability of public policy to address the problem (if and when needed) 
is diminished. As such, a further analysis may be useful to better understand 
whether the low level of SMEs concern with issues of occupational fraud 
is warranted and may be seen as a right attitude, or it is rather a product of 
unawareness whereas the true seriousness of the problem is greater than the 
current knowledge inferences. Government may be best positioned to undertake 
such an analysis due to cost implications which are likely to discourage the 
private sector from undertaking such or similar initiative.
For the time being, all businesses are encouraged to deliberately explore their 
own exposure to risk and to conduct some sensitivity analysis; both around 
the  entity’s  current  response  to  occupational  fraud  and  to  organizational 
tolerances. Driven by relative cost and marginal utility, the merit of alternate 
and complementary techniques, and the recognized principle of diminishing 
returns, the entity is best served to have a deliberate discussion. In so doing, 
the entity’s prospects are improved for evolving a comprehensive and well-
resourced,  but  responsible,  occupational  fraud  program  that  is  clear  and 
supported from the top.
Importantly, existing techniques, processes and controls should not simply be 
abandoned on the premise of designing a ‘newer’ program as many of the 
existing procedures may in fact be serving as highly effective occupational 
fraud deterrents. While the existence of an internal audit program for example 52
is most often seen as a fraud detection technique, a reasonable argument could 
be made that knowledge of its existence serves as a deterrent (preventative) 
to occupational fraud. To conclude that such a strategy does not serve the 
occupational fraud agenda because it may seldom detect or expose a fraud 
would be ill concluded as the mere presence of it serves to alter behaviour and 
inhibit wilful fraudulent acts.53
Appendix A: Survey Methodology 
and Questionnaire
Survey Methodology
The survey was administered by Synovate from August 15 to September 16, 2011. 
The interview questionnaire was designed by CGA-Canada in collaboration 
with senior staff of Synovate and pre-tested. The sampling methodology was 
designed to accommodate telephone interview process with businesses making 
a representative sample of SMEs across ten Canadian provinces.
For the purpose of this survey, an SME was defined as a company employing 
between  5  and  499  employees.  Quotas  were  determined  by  province,  as 
well as by size and industry type of company within each province. Size 
of company was measured as a number of employees in all establishments, 
whereas industry type of company was grouped into goods-producing and 
service-producing categories. Quotas were structured so that the final sample 
resembles the composition of SMEs by region, size and industry as rendered 
by the Canadian Business Patterns – 2010 published by Statistics Canada. The 
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A total of 802 interviews were completed. In each company, a senior manager 
was interviewed who would be knowledgeable of fraud related issues in the 
company. With this sample size, sampling error of plus or minus 3.46% is 
produced at a 95% confidence level (19 times in 20). 
Survey Questionnaire
Hello. My name is _______________, from Synovate, a Canadian marketing 
research firm. I am calling on behalf of the Certified General Accountants 
Association of Canada (CGA-Canada). I would like to speak to the Senior 
Manager who is most knowledgeable of fraud related issues in your organization. 
This could be the CEO or the Managing Director.
(INTERVIEWER: IF CEO OR MANAGING DIRECTOR IS  
NOT AVAILABLE ASK FOR HEAD OF FINANCE OR HEAD OF HR:  
May I please speak with Head of Finance or Head of HR?)
I am calling on behalf of the Certified General Accountants Association of 
Canada (CGA-Canada). CGA-Canada is interested in conducting a survey 
to collect information on prevention and detection methods used by Canadian 
small and medium-sized enterprises to safeguard against occupational fraud. 
The survey also seeks to gather information on the prevalence and types of 
occupational fraud experienced by small and medium-sized enterprises. 
We’re hoping you can help by taking time to answer some questions. The 
survey will take no more than 10 minutes, depending on what you have to say. 
As a token of appreciation, everyone who completes this survey will qualify 
to win one of several cash prizes to be awarded by random draw to survey 
participants. The first prize is worth $1,000, the second is worth $500 and 
finally there are 15 prizes worth $100 each.
Also, to thank you for your participation, you will receive a summary report 
of the results of this study.
The data reported in this survey will be treated with strict confidence and 
reported in aggregate form only.
Throughout  the  survey,  occupational  fraud  is  understood  as  the  use  of 
one’s occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or 
misappropriation of the employing organization’s resources or assets. Direct 
theft  where  no  deceit  is  involved  is  not  considered  fraud.  An  incident  of 
occupational fraud is understood as either a one-time event, or a set of events 55
repeated over time that originate from the same source, which have come to 
the attention of your company. 
(INTERVIEWER: REPEAT OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD DEFINITION 
AS NEEDED)
Q. S1.    How informed do you feel you are about occupational fraud 
related issues in your entire organization? Would you say you 
are...?
 
(INTERVIEWER: READ LIST. ACCEPT ONE RESPONSE ONLY)
  1.  Very informed  [skip to Q. S3]
  2.  Somewhat informed  [skip to Q. S3]
  3.  Somewhat not informed     [ask Q. T and then terminate]
  4.  Not at all informed    [ask Q. T and then terminate]
  Refused/Don’t know  (DO NOT READ)
        [ask Q. T and then terminate]
    [prog: if “somewhat not informed” or “not at all informed” or 
“don’t know”, ask Q. T and then terminate. otherwise skip to Q. S3]
Q. T.     Is there someone else you recommend who is more informed about 
occupational fraud related issues in your organization?
(INTERVIEWER: IF “YES”, PROBE FULLY, RECORD FULL NAME 
AND CONTACT INFORMATION)




  2.  No56
Q. S3.    In how many locations does your company operate in Canada? 
Would you say…?
(INTERVIEWER: DO NOT READ LIST. ACCEPT ONE 
RESPONSE ONLY)
  1.  1 location
  2.  2 to 4 locations
  3.  5 to 8 locations
  4.  More than 8 locations
  Don’t Know  (DO NOT READ) 
  Refused  (DO NOT READ)
Q. S4.    How many employees (full time and part time) does your 
company currently employ at all locations in Canada?  
Would you say…?
(INTERVIEWER: READ LIST. ACCEPT ONE RESPONSE ONLY)
  1.  Less than 5 employees   [prog: terminate]
  2.  5 to 9 employees
  3.  10 to 19 employees
  4.  20 to 49 employees
  5.  50 to 99 employees
  6.  100 to 199 employees
  7.  200 to 499 employees
  8.  500 or more employees  [prog: terminate]
  Don’t Know  (DO NOT READ)    
        [prog: terminate]
  Refused  (DO NOT READ)    
        [prog: terminate]
    [prog: all answering “less than 5”, “500 or more” or “don’t know/
refused” at Q. S4, terminate; otherwise continue]57
Q. S5.  For how many years has your company been in operation? 
(INTERVIEWER: READ LIST. ACCEPT ONE RESPONSE ONLY)
  1.  Less than 1 year   [prog: terminate]
  2.  1 to 3 years 
  3.  4 to 7 years 
  4.  8 to 15 years 
  5.  More than 15 years 
Q. S6.  What is your position in the company? 
(INTERVIEWER: READ LIST. ACCEPT ONE RESPONSE ONLY)   
  1.  CEO / President / Managing Director
  2.  CFO / Treasurer / Head of Finance
  3.  Head of HR Department
  4.  Owner
  5.  Other
 
    [prog: ask Q. S7 only if answer at Q. S6 is “other” and answer at 
Q. S3 is “2 or more”; otherwise skip to Q. 1]
Q. S7.     Do you have overall responsibility for the entire company  
in Canada?
  1.  Yes   [prog: continue]
  2.  No   [prog: terminate]
END OF SCREENING BLOCK58
Section 1: Measures Aiming at Preventing and Detecting 
Incidents of Occupational Fraud
Q. 1.    In your view, what level of risk does occupational fraud poses for 
your company?
(INTERVIEWER: READ LIST. ACCEPT ONE RESPONSE ONLY)
  1.  High
  2.  Moderate
  3.  Low
Q. 2.     In your view, to which of the following types of occupational 
fraud may your company be susceptible? 
(INTERVIEWER: READ LIST. ACCEPT ALL THAT APPLY) 
  1.  Misappropriation of cash
  2.  Misappropriation of inventory or assets 
  3.  Theft of proprietary information and intellectual property
  4.  Assets/Revenue overstatement or understatement
  5.    Misrepresentation of employment credentials, internal or 
external documents
  6.    Corruption (i.e. conflict of interest, accepting gifts, gratuities or 
secret commissions from vendors or other business contacts)
  7.  Other, please specify:   [prog: specify]
Q. 3.     Does your company undertake periodic (e.g. monthly, quarterly, 
annual) assessments of risks of occupational fraud?
  1.  Yes
  2.  No 59
Q. 4.     During the last fiscal year, which, if any, of the following 
measures and techniques were used by your company to prevent 
occupational fraud? 
(INTERVIEWER: READ LIST. ACCEPT ONE RESPONSE TO 
EACH MEASURE)
  [prog]
  1.  Yes
  2.  No 
  [prog: randomize list]
  1.  Pre-employment screening of employees
  2.  Fraud awareness and ethics training among employees
  3.  Fraud awareness and ethics training among management
  4.    Existence and enforcement of the formal code of 
employee conduct
  5.  Segregation of duties and authorisation policies for transactions
  6.  Mandatory job or assignment rotation / mandatory vacations
  7  Existence of physical safeguards to secure company assets
  8.  Existence of clear and uniform accounting procedures 
  9.  Frequent financial reviews and/or reconciliations
  10.  Other, please specify:   [prog: specify]
  11.  none     [prog: autopunch if “no” 
to all of other options]60
Q. 5.     During the last fiscal year, which, if any, of the following 
methods and techniques were used by your company to detect 
occupational fraud? 
(INTERVIEWER: READ LIST. ACCEPT ONE RESPONSE TO 
EACH METHOD)
  [prog]
  1.  Yes
  2.  No 
  [prog: randomize list]
  1.  Internal audit
  2.  External audit
  3.  Surprise controls
  4.    Use of data mining and statistical techniques to analyze patterns 
of business activities
  5.  System of monitoring and safeguarding assets
  6.    System that allows employees to report alleged violations  
(e.g. fraud hotline, whistleblowing provisions)
  7.  Other, please specify:   [prog: specify]
  8.  None     [prog: autopunch if “no” 
to all of other options]
Q. 6.     Does your company have a Fraud Response Plan for incidents of 
occupational fraud?
  1.  Yes
  2.  No 61
Q. 7.     For each of the next statements, please tell me whether you 
strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, 
somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each statement
  [prog: grid]
  1.  Strongly agree
  2.  Somewhat agree
  3.  Neither agree nor disagree
  4.  Somewhat disagree
  5.  Strongly disagree
  [prog: randomize list]
  1.    Your company has experienced a significant decline in financial 
performance in the past 3 years
  2.    Your company has been rapidly expanding and diversifying in 
the past 3 years
  3.    The amount of resources allocated by your company to 
prevention and/or detection of occupational fraud have noticeably 
decreased in the past 3 years
  4.    Your company needs a significant improvement in the area of 
occupational fraud prevention
  5.    Your company needs a significant improvement in the area of 
occupational fraud detection
END OF SECTION 162
Section 2: Occupational Fraud Incidents  
Experienced During the Last Fiscal Year
Q. 8.     How many incidents of the following types of occupational fraud 
did your company experience during the last fiscal year?
(INTERVIEWER: DO NOT READ LIST. IF RESPONDENT IS UNSURE, 
ASK FOR ESTIMATE)
  [prog]
  1.  None
  2.  One 
  3.  Two
  4.  Three 
  5.  Four or more
  6.  Don’t know
  [prog: randomize list]
  1.  Misappropriation of cash
  2.  Misappropriation of inventory or assets 
  3.  Theft of proprietary information and intellectual property
  4.  Assets/Revenue overstatement or understatement
  5.    Misrepresentation of employment credentials, internal or 
external documents
  6.    Corruption (i.e. conflict of interest, accepting gifts, gratuities or 
secret commissions from vendors or other business contacts)
  7.  Other types of occupational fraud
  [prog: skip to Q. 14 if “none” to all list items in Q. 8]
  [prog: show list items selected as one or more incident in Q. 8]63
Q. 9.     Thinking about the single largest incident of occupational fraud 
your company experienced in the last fiscal year, what type of 
fraud was that? 
(INTERVIEWER: READ LIST. ACCEPT ONE RESPONSE ONLY)   
  1.  Misappropriation of cash
  2.  Misappropriation of inventory or assets 
  3.  Theft of proprietary information or intellectual property
  4.  Assets/Revenue overstatement or understatement
  5.    Misrepresentation of employment credentials, internal or 
external documents
  6.    Corruption (i.e. conflict of interest, accepting gifts, gratuities or 
secret commissions from vendors or other business contacts)
  7.  Other, please specify:   [prog: specify]
Q. 10.     Thinking about the single largest incident of occupational 
fraud your company experienced in the last fiscal year, how was 
it uncovered? 
(INTERVIEWER: READ LIST. ACCEPT ONE RESPONSE ONLY)   
  1.  Reported by employees
  2.  Reported by managers
  3.  Identified by internal audit and/or compliance personnel
  4.  Identified by external auditors
  5.  Reported by customers / business contacts
  6.  Uncovered through data mining and data analysis
  7.  Uncovered during surprise controls
  8.  Uncovered by accident
  9.  Other, please specify:  [prog: specify]64
Q. 11.    What is the range of financial losses incurred by your company 
due to incidents of occupational fraud experienced during the 
last fiscal year? 
(INTERVIEWER: READ LIST. ACCEPT ONE RESPONSE ONLY)
  1.  $1 to $1,000
  2.  $1,000 to $5,000
  3.  $5,000 to $25,000
  4.  $25,000 to $75,000
  5.  $75, 000 to $200,000 
  6.  More than $200,000
  7.  Don’t know   (DO NOT READ)
  Refused   (DO NOT READ)
Q. 12.     Which of the following aspects of your business were negatively 
affected by the incidents of occupational fraud experienced in the 
last fiscal year? 
(INTERVIEWER: READ LIST. ACCEPT ALL THAT APPLY)   
  1. Business relationships
  2. Public/client trust
  3. Company’s value
  4. Company’s reputation
  5. Company’s ability to attract and retain employees
  6. Staff morale
  7. Other, please specify:   [prog: specify]
  8. None     [prog: autopunch if “no” 
to all of other options]65
Q. 13.     Which of the following internal policies and practices were 
revised by your company as a result of occupational fraud 
experienced in the last fiscal year? 
(INTERVIEWER: READ LIST. ACCEPT ONE RESPONSE TO 
EACH POLICY)
  [PROG: GRID]
  1.  Yes
  2.  No 
  [prog: randomize list]
  1.  Disciplinary actions to be administered in the case of fraud
  2.  Protocol establishing investigation procedures
  3.  Protocol establishing segregation of duties
  4.    Policies and channels for reporting employees’ concerns 
about fraud
  5.  Protocols for hiring and retaining employees
  6.  Company’s code of ethics and conduct
  7.    Quantity / frequency of fraud awareness and ethics training 
among employee 
  8.    Quantity / frequency of fraud awareness and ethics training 
among management 
  9.  Policy regarding financial review / reconciliation
  10.  Fraud Response Plan
  11.  Other, please specify:   [prog: specify]
  12. None    [prog: autopunch if “no”
 to all of other options]
END OF SECTION 266
Section 3: General Information
Q. 14.   In which province is your company headquartered? 
(INTERVIEWER: DO NOT READ LIST. ACCEPT ONE 
RESPONSE ONLY)
  1.  British Columbia 
  2.  Alberta
  3.  Saskatchewan
  4.  Manitoba
  5.  Ontario
  6.  Quebec
  7.  New Brunswick 
  8.  Nova Scotia
  9.  Prince Edward Island
  10.  Newfoundland and Labrador
Q. 15.   In which industry is your company’s main business or service? 
(INTERVIEWER: READ LIST. ACCEPT ONE RESPONSE ONLY)
  1.  Accommodation and food services
  2.  Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting
  3.  Construction
  4.  Finance and insurance
  5.  Health care and social assistance
  6.  Manufacturing
  7.  Professional, scientific and technical services 
  8.  Real estate and rental and leasing
  9.  Retail trade and consumer services
  10.  Transportation and warehousing
  11.  Other67
Q. 16.   Which of the following best describes your company?
(INTERVIEWER: READ LIST. ACCEPT ONE RESPONSE ONLY)
  1.  For-profit – privately owned 
  2.  For-profit – publicly-traded 
  3.  Not-for-profit / voluntary
  4.  Government
  5.  Other
Q. 17.     What was the level of gross annual revenue of your company in 
the last fiscal year (measured in Canadian dollars)? 
(INTERVIEWER: READ LIST. ACCEPT ONE RESPONSE ONLY)
  1.  Under $5 million 
  2.  $5 to $15 million 
  3.  $15 to $75 million 
  4.  More than $75 million 
END OF SECTION 3
Q. 18.    This concludes the survey, but I just have one more question.  
Would you like to be informed when the final report containing 
the survey results is available on the CGA-Canada website (www.
cga.org/canada)?
  1.  Yes
  2.  No
  [prog: ask Q. 19 if “yes” in Q. 18]68
Q. 19.  Would you prefer to be informed by phone or email?
  1.  Phone
  2.  Email
(INTERVIEWER: IF “EMAIL” IN Q. 19, OBTAIN EMAIL ADDRESS, 
READ BACK ADDRESS TO THE RESPONDENT)
  [prog: if prefer email ask email address]
  __________________________________
Q. 20.    We need to call you for notification, should you win the draw. 
Please provide the best phone number to reach you:
  First Name
  Last Name
  Phone Number
  [prog: show address] 
Q. 21.    Finally, we need to confirm the address for sending the 
summary report:
(INTERVIEWER: READ ADDRESS TO THE RESPONDENT)
  First Name
  Last Name
  Mailing address
Those are all the questions we have
Thank you for your participation69
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